T. Rauf "Addressing Dangers from Nuclear-Weapon Arsenals and Doctrines and the Lack of Nuclear Disarmament"

On 7 July 2017, 122 non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) approved a multilaterally negotiated Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). This new Treaty came about as a direct result of decades of frustration on the slow pace of nuclear weapons disarmament by the NPT nuclear-weapon States (NWS) and heightened recognition of the unimaginable humanitarian and environmental consequences of the detonation of even one nuclear weapon. As reported by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), at the beginning of this year, nine nuclear-armed States—China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, United Kingdom and the United States—had nearly 4,150 operationally deployed nuclear weapons and combined arsenals totalling approximately 14,935 nuclear weapons. And, despite five nuclear security summits—in 1996, 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016—83% of the world’s nuclear materials (highly-enriched uranium and plutonium) amounting to nearly 2,000 tonnes remain completely outside of any international monitoring or transparency. In light of this, what is to be done to preserve the NPT and the nuclear disarmament process? How can engagement be built on disarmament of nuclear weapons? In this regard, this paper discusses transparency measures concerning nuclear weapons that contribute to facilitating disarmament; as well as issues relating to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and a future fissile material (cut-off) treaty (FM(C)T) that covers existing stocks, and verification of nuclear disarmament.